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Abstract. Explosive growth of the Internet and lack of mechanisms that
validate the authenticity of a packet source produced serious security and
accounting issues. In this paper, we propose validating source addresses
in LAN using Host Identity Protocol (HIP) deployed in a ﬁrst-hop router.
Compared to alternative solutions such as CGA, our approach is suitable
both for IPv4 and IPv6. We have implemented SAVAH in Wi-Fi access
points and evaluated its overhead for clients and the ﬁrst-hop router.
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1 Introduction
Routing of packets in the Internet is based on the destination IP address. It is
hard to identify the source of the packet. Attackers can easily spoof the source
IP address of a packet; hosts under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks cannot trace
the originators. Another negative result can be a blocked service for a given
source address, which can be the address of a good host compromised by an
attacker.
These issues forced the source address validation to become an urgent prob-
lem in networking research. Several existing solutions are based on cryptographic
authentication, traceback, and ﬁltering. In this paper, we propose a solution
called Source Address Validation Architecture with Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
(SAVAH), which involves cryptographic authentication and ﬁltering based on
the host identiﬁers. This method integrates with a source address validation
architecture (SAVA) [1], and acts as an alternative to proposed method of vali-
dating source addresses on the edge (or ﬁrst-hop) router using Cryptographically
Generated Addresses (CGA).
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) is a new security protocol which integrates
host locator/identiﬁer split, mobility, and multihoming. It was speciﬁed by
IETF [10, 12, 11, 8, 9, 14, 13, 16]. Possessing important properties such as a
secure and eﬃcient session key negotiation and self generated host identiﬁers for
authentication, HIP can help to solve the problem of source address validation.
We believe that SAVAH can be deployed in a large-scale network and in-
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general, we think that HIP-based source address validation can become a re-
placement for a CGA approach [1]. We also think that it provides more security
than any of the existing solutions for the source address validation in a local
network, as it relies on a cryptographically secure protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of Host Iden-
tity Protocol. Section 3 summarizes related work. In Section 4, design and im-
plementation of SAVAH is described. In Section 5, we discuss integration of our
proposal with general SAVA architecture. Performance measurements are given
in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background on Host Identity Protocol
The existing Internet architecture was designed for stationary hosts and faces
many non-trivial challenges today with the growing number of mobile terminals.
Currently, there are two namespaces used globally by the Internet services and
applications, domain names and IP addresses. IP addresses serve the dual role
in the Internet being both end host identiﬁers and topological locators. This
general principle does not allow hosts to change their location without breaking
ongoing transport protocol connections that are strictly bound to IP addresses.
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [8, 6] was proposed to overcome the prob-
lem of using IP addresses for host identiﬁcation and routing. The idea behind
HIP is based on decoupling the network layer from the higher layers in the
protocol stack architecture (see Figure 1).
HIP deﬁnes a new global name space, the Host Identity name space, thereby
splitting the double meaning of IP addresses. When HIP is used, upper layers
do not anymore rely on IP addresses as host names. Instead, Host Identities are
used by the transport protocol for establishing connections. IP addresses at the
same time act purely as locators for routing packets towards the destination.
For compatibility with IPv6 legacy applications, Host Identity is represented by
a 128-bit long hash, the Host Identity Tag (HIT).
HIP oﬀers several beneﬁts including end-to-end security, resistance to CPU
and memory exhausting denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, NAT traversal, mobility
and multihoming support.
3 Related Work
There are three main methods for source address validation: cryptographic au-
thentication, ingress/egress packet ﬁltering, and various traceback techniques.
Cryptographic authentication appears a promising solution which brings
strong security properties for authenticating originator of the network communi-
cation. IPSec [7] is one example, which allows secure end-to-end communication.
Wu et al. [15] point out that IPSec depends on global deployment of PKI in-
frastructure. HIP [6, 8] in combination with HIP-enabled ﬁrewall, in turn, canSAVAH: Source Address Validation with Host Identity Protocol 3
Fig. 1. HIP architecture.
provide basic functionality for source address authentication and validation. One
possibility will be covered in Section 4.
Another approach is SPM [5] designed for authorization of neighboring au-
tonomous systems (AS). This approach provides solution for source address au-
thorization and relies on cryptographic properties.
Filtering of malicious packets containing wrong source addresses can be con-
sidered a simple solution. Unlike solutions based on cryptographic properties, it
is straightforward to deploy, but less secure approach. Examples can be ingress
ﬁltering, SAVE protocol [4] and HCF ﬁltering [3].
4 SAVAH Design and Implementation
We considered three possible approaches when designing the source address val-
idation mechanism using HIP.
1. First, a so-called pure HIP communication with HIP ﬁrewall in-between.
This requires that all communicating peers support HIP. Then the HIP ﬁre-
wall (which should be deployed on an edge of a local network) tracks base
exchange signaling packets from all hosts that try to communicate with the
hosts outside the local network and only lets through the packets with valid
HITs and IP addresses. Later, data is sent in ESP encapsulated packets so
that the ﬁrewall can check the SPI values of the packets and drop those
that do not match a previously seen base exchange. This approach requires
a large-scale deployment of HIP protocol.
2. Secondly, we assume that hosts inside the local network support HIP with
our extension. Then the HIP base exchange can replace a CGA approach [15].
This case is the main focus of the article and will be discussed in detail.
3. Finally, HIP tunneling approach can be used. It is less eﬃcient in perfor-
mance, but can provide better security and mobility support to wireless
clients. The client creates a tunnel between itself and the SAVAH router us-
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through this tunnel to the Internet. There were previous studies on tunneling
the traﬃc to home router in PISA [2].
4.1 SAVAH Architecture
SAVAH targets to solve the source address validation problem in the edge router
of the local network serving as a default gateway. SAVAH architecture is com-
posed of two main components:
– A SAVAH-enabled client, which is a combination of a HIP daemon and a
ﬁrewall in a client mode supporting SAVAH extension.
– A SAVAH-enabled router running the HIP daemon and the ﬁrewall but in a
server mode.
DHCP server can be considered the third component in our architecture. Its
main role in the network is to oﬀer particular conﬁguration for SAVAH aware
hosts. For instance, DHCP can provide the default gateway IP address as well
as a HIT of the SAVAH router. Availability of a proper conﬁgured DHCP server
can help to solve the problem of opportunistic mode as discussed later in this
section. However, we consider DHCP as an optional component in the network.
SAVAH aware clients can be conﬁgured manually, meaning that the IP ad-
dress and the HIT of the SAVAH router can be setup by a system administrator
prior to any communication. However, manual conﬁguration can be a tedious
task in a large scale network. As the third option, the SAVAH-enabled client can
discover the SAVAH router using the opportunistic mode.
The message sequence diagram for SAVAH registration and further authenti-
cation process is shown in Figure 2. It involves three entities in the local network
to perform the source address validation: the SAVAH client, the SAVAH router,
and the DHCP server (optionally). The receiver in Figure 2 is playing the role
of a legacy peer, i.e., it may or may not support HIP. Of course, if both commu-
nicating peers support HIP, whole scenario requires only a normal HIP-enabled
ﬁrewall to ﬁlter the traﬃc based on HITs.
Since the SAVAH router is the ﬁrst-hop router, it should be placed on the edge
of the local network and serve as a default gateway. If the default gateway and
the SAVAH router are not placed physically on the same node it is meaningless,
because all network traﬃc ﬂowing through the SAVAH-unaware router would
not contain the SAVAH option and would be discarded.
4.2 SAVAH Router Discovery
Unless the DHCP server oﬀers a HIT of the SAVAH router during the address
assignment phase, the SAVAH client is obliged to discover the presence of the
SAVAH service automatically. Otherwise, the client is aware of the HIT and the
IP address of the SAVAH router and can register to the service directly. It is
also possible to preconﬁgure the client and specify the IP address and HIT of
the default gateway.SAVAH: Source Address Validation with Host Identity Protocol 5
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Fig. 2. SAVAH service registration and authentication process.
Optionally, the presence of a SAVAH-unaware DHCP means that the client
will obtain only the IP address of the default gateway. No prior knowledge of
the SAVAH router’s HIT forces the client to discover the service using the HIP
opportunistic mode [6] and a set of usual procedures for HIP service registra-
tion [11].
The drawback of such broadcasting is that in the opportunistic mode the
client is unaware of the HIT of SAVAH router and any node can thus pretend to
be a valid router. This resembles a similar problem with SSH when connecting to
unknown hosts. Hence, the opportunistic mode should be used only in a trusted
environment.
To trigger a registration in opportunistic mode, the SAVAH client requests
from the system the default gateway IP address and sends an I1 packet with the
destination HIT as a hashed source IP address. On the other side, the default
gateway running SAVAH in a server mode responds with an R1 packet containing
an oﬀer for available services in REG INFO parameter.
Upon receiving the R1 packet the client chooses the supported services and
responds with an I2 packet containing a REG REQUEST parameter to SAVAH
server. If REG INFO parameter does not contain the SAVAH service oﬀer, the
client completes base exchange normally and afterward falls back to normal
communication, i.e., the SAVAH mode is not supported in this network.
Finally, depending on the setup of the SAVAH router, it either grants or
denies the service to a client in an R2 packet with a REG RESPONSE or
REG FAILED parameter. Receiving a REG FAILED parameter in an R2 mes-
sage during the base exchange or experiencing a timeout in an I1 state means
that either the default gateway does not support SAVAH extension or that HIP
daemon with SAVAH extension is not running at all.6 Dmitriy Kuptsov and Andrei Gurtov
This situation should indicate the SAVAH client to fallback to normal com-
munication, i.e., the packets to be forwarded through the default gateway would
not contain any authentic information. As an opposite result, if the SAVAH
router grants the service to the registering client, both parties will posses a
shared secret key.
4.3 Packet Authentication
For performance reasons, the keys in use for authentication (i.e., HMAC keys) in
IPSec were selected to authenticate the source addresses. Depending on a setup,
symmetric cryptography can be selected as well.
Filtering on HITs can be applied to ensure that the peer trying to register
to the SAVAH service is legitimate. This ﬁltering can enforce to either grant
or deny the SAVAH service to the registrars. Firewall rules in the HIP-enabled
ﬁrewall control such decisions. By default, all packets with an unknown identiﬁer
are dropped.
After completion of the HIP base exchange, the SAVAH router adds the
source IP address of the host to a database. This works if no record with such
IP address were already present in the database. If a record with such IP address
already exists, it is likely that the host is trying to spoof someone else address
and the packet should be dropped nor any state added. Moreover, this incident
can be logged and reported for further analysis.
If the host experiences an address change, then the record is replaced with a
new IP address. To ensure the validity of the host, a HIP UPDATE packet has to
be received and handled properly. This will guarantee that the host indeed the
one it is claiming to be. The record should be removed from the database upon
a timeout or when the host removes a security association (e.g., a HIP CLOSE
packet is received from the corresponding host). To ensure that the client is alive,
the SAVAH router can also send heartbeats to the client without waiting for the
timeout.
After the secret keys are established by means of the HIP base exchange,
the SAVAH client may communicate with the nodes outside of the local net-
work by including an authenticated source IP address in each packet. Current
implementation has two options to deliver the authenticated hash value to the
router. The ﬁrst approach is to replace the original source IP address of each
packet with truncated result obtained from HMAC(key|{P}) operation, where
{P} is the packet to be transmitted. We have chosen the packet value as a feed
to the HMAC function to introduce a simple protection mechanism from replay
attacks.
This approach has some drawbacks. First of all, for IPv4 networks the size
of authentication value will be only 32 bits. Secondly, that would decrease the
performance since additional address translation would be required on the router.
Finally, that method will require additional changes to the router to recognize
locally routed traﬃc.
A diﬀerent way to carry the authenticated source IP address to SAVAH router
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all SAVAH related options are striped out on the forward direction, this ensures
that no modiﬁcations are required for other routers on the path. Placing the
authentication value in the IP option can have certain advantages. First of all,
this approach slightly optimizes the performance of the architecture. Secondly,
stronger security can be achieved by increasing the length of the authentication
value. We suggest to keep this length within wise bounds, since it aﬀects the size
of the actual payload.
4.4 Source Address Validation
To authenticate the packet source address, the following algorithm is used. On
the router side, each packet in forward direction is checked for the SAVAH IP
option. If found, the router compares the value of the option against truncated
128-bit result from HMAC(key|{P}) operation, where {P} is the packet to be
forwarded. If matches, the SAVAH option is striped out and the packet is re-
injected to the network. If not, the pinhole is searched for a given source and
destination IP addresses. If the pinhole is found, the packet is said to be an
inbound packet for previously authenticated outbound communication. Finally,
if both fail the packet is dropped.
If the tunneling approach is used, then the authentication succeeds if the
SAVAH router can successfully decrypt the ESP packet and resend encapsulated
in ESP original packet to its ﬁnal destination. Unlike in the lightweight approach
for inbound traﬃc, the SAVAH router in a tunnel mode should properly encrypt
and tunnel the packet to the corresponding mobile node.
Storing a mapping between the identity and the source IP address of each
accessing client on the SAVAH router, allows to keep track for the duplicate and
spoofed IP addresses, and account each packet traversing the router.
Whether the network access is controlled by the ACL or not, spooﬁng of the
source IP addresses is eliminated as there can be only one mapping between one
particular HIT and the IP address. The mapping can be updated or removed
once the corresponding UPDATE or CLOSE packet arrives and validated by
the SAVAH router. Even when no ACL is maintained, the client cannot forge
the source IP address because for each newly self-assigned IP address and/or
generated HIT the user needs to complete a four-way HIP handshake with the
SAVAH router.
If the address is spoofed with an address of the same subnetwork, the SAVAH
router will detect a duplicate address use (because of a locally stored mapping
table), and will prohibit the registration to the service. As an additional security
action, such activity can be logged and reported. Moreover, non-repudiation
property of HIP allows to take a counter measure against such users. If the
client tries to spoof the IP address with an address of a network other than
the local, such packets should be ﬁltered out with ingress ﬁltering deployed on
the SAVAH router. Hence, spoofed packets will be dropped and the user will be
logged as malicious and banned from using the network.
For the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, several address spooﬁng
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including various redirect attacks (e.g., DNS redirect, smurf, fraggle, etc.), DoS
attacks (those that rely on spooﬁng the source address), and SYN ﬂood attacks
(since most of the SYN ﬂood attacks require to generate TCP SYN packets with
a spoofed source address) become hard to launch.
5 Deployment and Integration with General SAVA
Architecture
We are planning to pilot our architecture in a large-scale IPv6 network in Ts-
inghua University and CERNET2 in China. Our source address validation is
placed on the border between local network and the ﬁrst autonomous system.
Instead of CGA mechanism for source address validation [1], HIP with SAVA
extension is used as shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Integrating SAVAH with inter-AS source address validation.
The key strength of our proposal is that in addition to basic source address
validation our implementation adds support for mobility, multihoming, data in-
tegrity and encryption. Another advantage is that accounting can be maintained
easily since the network access is controlled based on valid registered HITs. Al-
though this is not necessary to validate the source address, it can be considered
as a plus in large-scale networks. However, as with CGA mechanism, our archi-
tecture requires modiﬁcations to hosts residing in the local network to pass the
authentication procedure.
Figure 4 shows how SAVAH can be deployed and used in a public wireless
network, for instance in PanOULU [18] or Tsinghua University campus network,
to validate, authenticate, and account network traﬃc. The ﬁgure describes pos-
sible step-by-step procedure for adding an unknown HIT to ACL:
1. First, a client tries to register with a SAVAH router using the procedure
described in Section 4.SAVAH: Source Address Validation with Host Identity Protocol 9
2. In case the HIP ﬁrewall does not ﬁnd the client HIT in the ACL, it drops
all packets except for HTTP traﬃc which is redirected to the SAVAH regis-
tration HTTP server. Otherwise, the client successfully completes the HIP
base exchange and is permitted to use the network.
3. A web registration form is sent to the client browser. The client provides
his email and HIT and submits the form. As an alternative the client can
identify itself by some other mechanism, for instance using Internet banking.
4. The SAVAH registration server checks if the submitted email belongs to the
list of allowed domains (pre-conﬁgured database). It generates the authen-
tication link and sends it to the given email address.
5. The client retrieves the email.
6. The client clicks the link in the email and thus authenticates the previously
submitted HIT.
7. The authenticated HIT is distributed to all SAVAH routers and HIP ﬁrewalls.
PC - Policy coordinator
DF - Distributed HIP Firewall
1
2
3
MS - Mail server
4
5
6
7
7
7
FHR - First-Hop SAVAH Router
DF DF
DF DF
MS
FHR
SC - SAVAH client
SC
Fig. 4. A HIT registration procedure.
6 Performance Evaluation
In the experiential setup, we used a wireless access point and a laptop. The
wireless access point was running a modiﬁed version of OpenWRT Linux distri-
bution [17], a HIP daemon, and a ﬁrewall in a SAVAH server mode. The laptop
was running Ubuntu Linux and HIP in a SAVAH client mode.
We assume that our network is trusted, hence we use an opportunistic mode
to discover the SAVAH router presence in the network. Hardware characteristics10 Dmitriy Kuptsov and Andrei Gurtov
of the SAVAH router and client are shown in Table 1. Our testbed supports both
IPv4 and IPv6 network stacks and we can evaluate SAVAH extension in both
conﬁgurations.
Table 1. Test hardware.
Parameter First-hop router Laptop
CPU 533 MHz Dual core 2.4 GHz
RAM 128 MB 3GB
Wireless Atheros BG Intel AGN
We performed measurements of packet processing time in the router and the
client. Collected results are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 for the router and
client correspondingly. The expected time for packet processing in both ends
(i.e., for router and client) is 9ms and 1ms. In theory, these results should allow
to process on the average 110 packets per second in the router and around 1000
packets in the client. Hence, we estimate throughput of 1.3Mbps and 13Mbps in
the router and in the client (assuming the Ethernet MTU 1500B).
Such performance is not suﬃcient for a router on the edge of a network with
heavy traﬃc. Since our implementation is only a proof-of-concept, its optimiza-
tion should help to overcome this hurdle. On the other hand, implementation
can be faster in using RSA or DSA signatures [2]. For instance, the time re-
quired to check one DSA signature was about 63.7 ms. However, by compiling
the prototype without debugging information and with several optimizations,
the performance can be increased by 150 − 200%.
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Fig. 5. SAVAH packet processing time in the ﬁrst-hop router (Avila board).
The memory costs are insigniﬁcant in the SAVAH mode. We have tested
SAVAH extension during long period of time by streaming video ﬁles. We haveSAVAH: Source Address Validation with Host Identity Protocol 11
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Fig. 6. SAVAH packet processing time in a client (laptop).
noticed that memory usage on the SAVAH router stayed below 26MB boundary.
On a device such as the Avila board (used as a router), this is not signiﬁcant.
The CPU usage showed 100% load when heavy traﬃc is streamed through
the router. The scheduler releases all CPU cycles to a demanding application.
In our case, the HIP daemon and ﬁrewall were the only applications in an active
state. Thus, this does not necessarily leads to a decrease in performance of
other applications. Instead, 100% usage of CPU tells that the application is
a resource hungry. However, memory copy operations required to strip out the
SAVAH option are currently ineﬃcient and can be optimized. On the other hand,
calculating HMAC does stress the CPU and a packet is processed faster than if
any other (symmetric or asymmetric) cryptography would have been used.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a secure mechanism for validating source addresses
and authenticating hosts in the local network. In SAVAH, local hosts use the ex-
tended Host Identity Protocol (HIP) to connect to legacy Internet hosts through
a ﬁrst-hop router which authenticates users.
SAVAH architecture involves three network entities, a network conﬁgura-
tion server (DHCP), a client, and a router supporting extended HIP for host
authenticating and source address validation. We implemented the system by
re-ﬂashing ﬁrmware of a wireless access point with OpenWRT Linux and HIP
protocol supporting SAVAH extension.
Performance evaluation showed that SAVAH wireless access points can vali-
date source addresses and provide reasonable protection against address spoof-
ing. In addition, SAVAH oﬀers stronger cryptographic properties including au-
thentication, authorization, accountability, non-repudiation, and consistency.12 Dmitriy Kuptsov and Andrei Gurtov
Our approach enables host mobility and multihoming. In contrast to CGA-based
approach, SAVAH supports both IPv4 and IPv6, and is a patent-free technology.
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